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Abstract 
 
The main idea of this paper is to present an upper-layer security 
solution to solve security problems of the wireless network. The IEEE 
802.11 standard defines the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) Protocol. 
The goal of WEP is to provide data privacy to the wireless network. It 
is generally believed that the current wireless access points have a big 
security problem with WEP protocol. To solve this problem, a 
combination of Linux-based access point and IPSec bridge has been 
brought up to secure the wireless network. 
 
Key Words: Linux, IPSec, Bridge, Access Point, WEP, 802.11, 
Security, Wireless 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, the surge in notebook 
computers and PDA has caused an increase in 
the aspect of people's computing. At the same 
time, various kinds of wireless networks have 
gained a great deal of popularity. As a result, 
wireless network security is becoming much 
more important than ever before. Take the 
application of data transmission in the radio 
broadcast as an example. Due to the frequency 
and convenience of data transmission 
application nowadays, it is obvious that the 
necessity of communication protection is 
gradually turning to be a must, which can be an 
effective interception [1]. 
For the safety of the internal resources, many 
organizations usually especially install an Internet 
firewall to block attacks. However, the deploy of a 
wireless network opens a "back door" for attacker's 
access to secret data by radio waves. The 
advantage of wireless network is that it shares the 
waves in free space, which almost includes 
locations outside the physical control of wireless 
network administrators, such as the company's 
parking lot, facilities of other floors, or nearby 
high-rise buildings. Under the consideration of 
long-distance communication and to ensure the 
wireless network a safety system, which is 
fundamentally less secure than a wired one, it has 
the indispensability to build a sounder network 
space. 
2. The 802.11 Wireless Network 
2.1 Wireless Network Technologies 
Protocol 802.11 [2] refers to a family of 
WLAN (wireless LAN) specifications 
developed by a working group at the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE). 
802.11 defines the standard for WLANs, 
encompassing some disparate technologies. 
2.1.1 802.11e (Quality of Services) 
Supplementary to the MAC layer provides 
QoS support for LAN applications. It will apply 
to 802.11 physical standards a, b, and g. The 
purpose is to provide classes of services with 
managed levels of QoS for data, voice, and 
video applications. 
2.1.2 802.11f (Roaming) 
The standard defines the registration of 
access points within a network and the 
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interchange of information between access 
points while a user is handed over from one 
access point to another. 802.11f is currently 
working on specifying an IAPP (Inter Access 
Point Protocol), which provides the necessary 
information that access points need to exchange 
and to support the 802.11 distribution system 
functions. 
2.1.3 802.11i (MAC Enhancements for Enhanced 
Security) 
802.11i is still involved in development 
and approval processes. The specification might 
be officially released by early 2003. After it's 
available, 802.11i will provide replacement 
technology for WEP security. Initially, 802.11i 
will provide TKIP (Temporal Key Integrity 
Protocol) security that it is allowed to add to 
existing hardware with a firmware upgrade. In 
fact, TKIP is a temporary protocol for use until 
manufacturers implement AES at the hardware 
level. 
2.2 The WEP Protocol Security Problem 
WEP provides data confidentiality using a 
stream cipher called RC4 [3]. It's easy to break 
RC4 encryption if a second instance of 
encryption with a single key (a key stream 
reuse) can be isolated [4]. The WEP designers 
have been aware of this situation, so they build 
into WEP a so-called Initialization Vector (IV) 
[5], a 24-bit value that changes with each 
packet and is appended to the unchanging 
shared secret key to minimize the likelihood of 
"key collision" [6]. By exploiting the statistical 
properties of this weakness [7], an attacker can 
crack any message in hours [8], independently 
of others. AirSnort (http://airsnort.shmoo.com/) 
is one of the best-known WEP cracking tools, 
which employs this attack [9]. 
The sender calculates the CRC of the 
frame payload and appends it to the WEP 
encapsulated frame. It then selects a new IV 
(initialization vector) and appends this to the 
WEP shared key to form a "per-packet" key, 
and uses the result to generate an RC4 key 
schedule [10]. The IV value contains 24bits 
dynamic serial number. The frame then uses 
RC4 to generate a key stream equal to the 
length of the frame payload plus CRC [11]. 
The encrypted frame generates key stream 
against the plaintext payload data and CRC by 
XOR. The encrypted process is shown in 
Figure 1, and the format of the encrypted 
frame is shown pictorially in Figure 2 as well. 
To decrypt a frame protected by WEP, the 
receiver simply reverses the encryption 
process. First, the receiver extracts the IV 
from the frame, appends it to the WEP shared 
key, and generates the "pre-packet" RC4 key 
schedule. The receiver uses RC4 to produce a 
key stream. The receiver thus XOR this key 
stream with the packet’s encrypted payload 
and verifies the CRC of the decrypted payload 
data to certify that the frame data is correctly 
decrypted [12]. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The encrypted process 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The format of the encrypted frame 
 
The WEP IV is 24 bits long. Each frame 
transmission selects one of these 16M keys and 
encrypts the data under the key. The IV values 
can be reused, so we will get the same IV after 
16M frames. Then IV database can be built to 
compute the WEP shared key [13]. 
3. IPSec Bridge System 
A well-known WEP is weak, but if 
stronger security is needed, then upper-layer 
security protocols must be used. The IPSec is a 
common name for security extension of the IP 
protocol. Implementing the security on the IP 
layer is good because the applications won't 
need to be aware of it. The IPSec is very secure 
and has more options. The IPSec vs. WEP is 
shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. The IPSec vs. WEP 
3.1 Build Linux Access Point 
In this system, an IPSec bridge in Linux 
access point is built to secure the wireless 
network. One of the reason why choosing Linux 
as our operating system is that it is one of the 
most widely supported open source operating 
systems. The other reason is that we can put 
features in our system. Linux is not only stable 
but also low cost to ownership. Meanwhile, 
Linux makes it easy to build access point 
system, and port to Embedded System to make 
a real access point. In the experiment, we set up 
a computer with Linux OS and installed 
wireless lan card based on Intersil's Prism2 chip 
set. Run HostAP driver under RedHat Linux 7.3 
[14]. The driver supports HostAP mode, and 
meantime, it takes care of IEEE 802.11 
management functions in the host computer and 
acts as an access point. The Linux distributions 
have already included the bridge-utils package, 
and therefore, building a bridge system can be 
easy. The system has three network interfaces, 
which will be shown in Figure 3. In the chart, 
br0 is bridge network interface, eth0 is 10/100 
network interface, and wlan0 is wireless 
network interface. As it shows, it can be 
verified these as different traffic on each 
interface by tcpdump software. It is feasible to 
test some ICMP packet from the wireless client, 
and monitor the two interfaces by tcpdump. The 
tcpdump result is the same as that shown in 
Figure 4. In accordance to this, the access point 
works correctly under Linux. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The Host AP’s network interface 
Security Service IPSec WEP 
Anti-Replay Yes (IPSec seqnum) No 
Data Privacy Yes (DES/3DES) Yes 
(RC4) 
Data Integrity Yes (MD5/SHA) Yes but 
weak 
(CRC-32)
User 
Authentication 
Yes (XAUTH with 
pwd or cert) 
No 
Mutual 
Authentication 
Yes (preshared key, 
pub/priv keys or 
certs) 
No 
Key 
Management 
Yes (PKI) No 
Auto rekeying Yes (SA lifetime) No 
External Users 
DB 
Yes (RADIUS, 
LDAP) 
No 
Accounting, 
Monitoring 
Yes (RADIUS, 
SNMP) 
No 
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Figure 4. The tcpdump result 
3.2 Build IPSec Bridge 
Linux FreeS/WAN is an implementation of 
IPSec and IKE for Linux [15]. It can be used to 
secure the traffic. These services allow you to 
build secure tunnels through untrustful 
networks. This is an open source IPSec project, 
and as a result, it's allowed to get the source 
from the Internet. Then the source code of an 
incoming and outgoing packet sources is 
modified, and the packets are automatic 
encrypted and decrypted in the bridge interface. 
After that, ICMP packets are tested after set up 
IPSec, and comes different results with IPSec, 
that are shown in Figure 5. The packets 
response is IPSec ESP packets, so IPSec Bridge 
works just fine. 
 
 
Figure 5. The IPSec ESP packets response 
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3.3 IPSec Bridge Infrastructure Network 
The novel thing about IPSec Bridge is how it 
secures the wireless network between the client 
notebook and IPSec Bridge. In many networks, we 
use IPSec tunnel to secure our network between 
the client notebook and IPSec gateway. It has the 
necessity to change the router, which is quite 
expensive. From above description, the IPSec 
tunnel Infrastructure network can be constructed as 
shown in Figure 6. The IPSec Bridge is built in 
access point, and the IPSec tunnel is only between 
client notebook and access point on air. In local 
networks, we have firewall to protect Internet, thus 
there's no need of IPSec router. It only needs to 
secure the wireless network by IPSec access point 
that is shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 6. IPSec Tunnel 
 
Figure 7. IPSec Bridge 
4. Performance 
It is for certain to lose some performance by 
using WEP. Linux tests the performance about the 
impacts of WEP with Lucent Gold wireless card 
[16]. The test machine is Pentium III-600 with 
320MB ram. This will generate a 4MB file, and try 
to send file by any rate and WEP. This test is a 
measure of how fast data moves between a 
wireless client and access point. The tests send a 
file from client to client, measures how much time 
it takes, and calculates the result in Mbps. The 
result is shown in Table 2. As we can see, the 
transmission has 10% loss with 128bits WEP and 
5% loss with 40bits WEP in 11 Mbps. The WEP 
performance depends on wireless network card's 
chip, because the network card’s chip has 
hardware-based WEP options. And the IPSec 
bridge performance depends on access point's 
CPU. In this system, the Linux access point suffers 
slight loss in performance. 
 
Table 2. WEP and IPSec Performance test result 
5. Conclusions 
It will improve the security, secrecy and 
managerial convenience of wireless networks 
constructed by IPSec Bridge. We don't change any 
network gateway to support it. IPSec Bridge 
developed on Linux environment can be ported to 
embedded system to manufacture the Access Point 
series products. We can use the board—WL11000 
SA-N combined with AMD Eln-SC400 (CPU)—to 
produce Access Point as shown in Figure 8. The 
embedded system is better than personal computers. 
Nowadays there are more and more 
developments of Linux Access Point evolving 
various functions, such as the well performance of 
RADIUS (Remote Access Dial In User Service) 
Protocol, Firewall, or supports of QoS. It is 
feasible to adopt these given programs to design 
Access Point which are matched our demands. 
 
Figure 8. WL11000 SA-N combined AMD Eln-SC400 
Without 
WEP 
Wihout 
WEP 
With 
40bits 
WEP 
With 
128bits 
WEP 
IPSec 
Enabled 
1 Mbps 1,183,441 
bps 
1,142,451 
bps 
1,175,440 
bps 
1,182,314 
bps 
2 Mbps 2,127,334 
bps 
2,123,123 
bps 
2,116,332 
bps 
2,125,443 
bps 
5.5 Mbps 3,650,111 
bps 
3,651,332 
bps 
3,551,871 
bps 
3,700,011 
bps 
11 Mbps 4,524,322 
bps 
4,300,121 
bps 
4,082,889 
bps 
4,511,998 
bps 
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